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Abstract
This paper examines the cause of ethnic peace, and subsequently, the cause of ethnic violence. Varying
arguments have been used to explain ethnic violence: primordialism, instrumentalism, and
constructivism. The question central to this study is how master narratives, scarce resources, and
democratic institutions have influenced the occurrence of ethnic violence. Small n comparison is used to
analyze two pairs of sub-Saharan African nations in order to control for other explanatory variables: (1)
Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, and (2) Kenya and Tanzania. In each pair, one nation is relatively peaceful and
the other violent. Drawing from ethnographic research papers, and news sources this paper finds that
while cultural and economic factors play heavily into ethnic violence, it is the carrying capacity of political
institutions which enable ethnic peace. Better political institutions foster civic trust amongst citizens, and
ensure peaceful means for the demonstration of political and economic frustrations.
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EXPLAINING ETHNIC PEACE: THE IMPORTANCE OF
INSTITUTIONS
Rebecca Tong
Abstract This paper examines the cause of ethnic peace, and subsequently, the cause of ethnic
violence. Varying arguments have been used to explain ethnic violence: primordialism,
instrumentalism, and constructivism. The question central to this study is how master narratives,
scarce resources, and democratic institutions have influenced the occurrence of ethnic violence.
Small n comparison is used to analyze two pairs of sub-Saharan African nations in order to
control for other explanatory variables: (1) Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, and (2) Kenya and
Tanzania. In each pair, one nation is relatively peaceful and the other violent. Drawing from
ethnographic research papers, and news sources this paper finds that while cultural and
economic factors play heavily into ethnic violence, it is the carrying capacity of political
institutions which enable ethnic peace. Better political institutions foster civic trust amongst
citizens, and ensure peaceful means for the demonstration of political and economic frustrations.
States have become increasingly multicultural. As a result, individuals of varying ethnicities
have had to live side by side. The world has witnessed multiple genocides, and silently stood by; they
have seen the result of collective violence and blamed historic grudges. The “us against them”
mentality may be a true in the minds of individuals, but it is insufficient in explaining occurrences of
ethnic violence. The same is true for competition over resources; there are multicultural nations
where food, water, and jobs are scarce, and peace is abundant. What is it that leads some nations
down a spiral of violence, and sometimes to genocide, while others are able to foster peaceful
coexistence? In a future of uncertainty where genocides continue to occur and where nations are in
constant danger of slipping into the mire, it is necessary to discern what causes ethnic violence, or
what causes ethnic peace—different sides of the same coin. The world is becoming more
interconnected and ethnic groups are facing one another more often. In order to ensure peace,
nations must learn how to cultivate societies of civic trust across ethnic lines. The purpose of this
study is to answer two questions. First, what are the causes of both ethnic violence and ethnic
peace? Second, how have master narratives, scarce resources, and democratic institutions influenced
the occurrence or absence of ethnic peace?
Africa presents interesting cases of ethnic diversity, scarce resources, varying historical
experiences with colonialism, and a wide variance in institutional strengths. In selecting the
dependent variable we can isolate certain causal factors. Sub-Saharan African nations on average are
poor, and this helps to control for any economic factors at play. The level of ethnic diversity in
Africa is also ideal for such a study; often it is the case that nations have ethnic variety ranging over a
hundred. Finally, colonial experience has influenced how African nations have attempted to develop,
and the way in which democracy has been pursued. The dependent variable for this study is ethnic
violence, but because conflict and violence do not occur in a vacuum, a multitude of political and
historical factors must also be analyzed. Possible other explanatory variables which will be
considered are economic competition, political manipulation by elites, varying constructions of
citizenship, and political institutions.
While there are multiple explanations I believe political institutions best explain the
occurrence of ethnic peace. Such things as free press, independent legislatures, and viable opposition
parties provide peaceful ways to resolve competitions between ethnic groups. Scholars have
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presented and supported a variety of explanations for ethnic peace: primordialism, instrumentalism
(economic interests or political manipulation by the elites), and constructivism (institutions).
I define the three explanations below, but an objection to primordialism and
instrumentalism is that although such things as cultural identity, scarce resources, and the political
manipulation by elite are explanatory variables they are insufficient for grasping all facets of ethnic
violence. Without politically viable ethnic cleavages there is nothing for elites to exploit, nor is there
any sort of ethnic basis to such conflicts. This primordialist explanation has no peaceful solution
except mass exodus, and it over simplifies the lives of individuals. It writes off people as being either
irrational or rationally choosing to exterminate races. Many have responded to this
oversimplification with studies correlating economic competition with ethnic violence. They argue it
is when these political cleavages stack up nations become prone to ethnic violence. This statement
may be true, but it leads to an explanation where ethnic identity is reduced to something fluid and
purely instrumental. This study argues it is institutions which are key because they best explain the
causes of ethnic peace and not just violence. Even if a nation has an ascriptive master narrative, and
economic competition it is strong institutions such as elections, “civilian control over the military,
independent legislatures and courts, viable opposition parties, and voluntary association, [and] free
press” that prevent nations—otherwise pegged as being at risk—from dissolving into violence
(Bratton, 1997, p. 69).
The primordialist approach views ethnicity as fixed. As is the nature of ascriptive identities
they are ranked, written, and fixed. From an evolutionary perspective it makes logical sense that
individuals are biologically predisposed to protecting members of their own group and in some cases
fighting rival groups, all for the sake of passing on their genes. In addition, Frank P. Harvey explains
that according to primordialists “ethnic ties are inherently more potent (and fit) as an organizing
force than…ties based on class or occupation” (2000, 40-41). For example, Malay and Chinese in
Malaysia have been in conflict since the first Chinese traders landed there. These are two distinct
cultures that compete politically, economically, and socially; Donald Horowitz reasons that these are
the lines of interaction and dominant cleavages along which people align (1971). The rationale of
ethnic violence is ethnic differences. Therefore where there are multiple ethnicities, there is ethnic
violence (Lake and Rothchild 1998). This does not mean that violence or conflict is a constant state,
but that identity is the root cause. The history of bitter rivalry, age old conflicts over land, and
vengeance killings, or preemptive slaughter of populations can easily be attributed to identity.
Indeed identity can be an extremely compelling reason, but one criticism of this approach is
that it operates under the assumption that identities are fixed. It fails to explain the emergence of
new identities (Lake and Rothchild. 1998, 5). For example in the former Yugoslavia through history
people have changed the way they identify themselves, be it an Austrian, Serb, Yugoslavian, or
Muslim. What matters it not ethnicity purely, but ethnicities which are politically salient, where there
is an “us against them” construction to these identities. This point leads us to a second kind of
explanation.
Instrumentalism is the understanding that groups or collectives make a rational choice to
most strongly identify with a certain part of their identity for economic or political gain, whether this
is a linguistic, religious, or racial difference. Simply put, identity is a tool. This opportunistic use of
identity is precisely what Fearon and Laitin (2003) expect to see. Therefore, the likelihood of ethnic
violence or conflict is dependent upon whether the overall outcomes benefit and exceed the
transaction and coordination costs (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Primordialism links violence directly
with identity differences; instrumentalism does almost the complete opposite by citing economic
interests as being predominant. Political elites can and do use ethnic divisions to their advantage, in
the colonial experience of many European-colonized African states where ethnic divisions were
capitalized upon in order to keep groups from rising up against the imperial governments. The Hutu
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were played off against the Tutsi and more formally separated racially so that one group could
oppress the other, leaving the dominant ethnic group dependent on colonial support as well. More
recently, this can be conceptualized through the Malay-Chinese division in Malaysia. The Chinese are
what Amy Chua (2002) terms a market-dominant minority in Malaysia. Therefore this isn’t a conflict
based on ethnic identities strictly, but rather on economic inequality. The citizens of Malaysia have
chosen to align along a Chinese-Malay line, rather than a Muslim-Christian, or native-foreigner way,
and politicians have been able to use identity for political purposes.
In this line of thinking ethnic conflicts and their causes are applicable to all conflicts. Ethnic
conflict is simply a part of an overarching ongoing conflict (Lake and Rothchild. 1998, 6). Although
seductive instrumentalism assumes that individuals or leaders can choose their identity, this is
something “embedded within and controlled by the larger society” (Lake and Rothchild. 1998, 6).
You can not choose your identity. It is something individuals are born into. French Muslims, for
example, may conceive themselves to be French citizens, but to society at large they are Muslims
first, and therefore will always have a foreign element. If ethnicity is purely elastic and instrumental
then there would be little for political elites to exploit because conflict would be purely economically
motivated. Identities need to be politically salient to be useful for exploitation. Therefore there is
something to be said for group identification, it is compelling enough to average citizens to make
them riot, or mass murder people. It could be that instrumentalism is true for the elite and the upper
class, but it is less convincing in the lower class. Furthermore, while instrumentalism may explain
ethnic violence, it cannot explain ethnic peace.
This brings us to the final approach, constructivism. It is essentially a bridge between
primordialism and instrumentalism. It posits that ethnicity is a social identification, not just an
individual one. Unlike instrumentalism, constructivism recognizes that ethnicities are not chosen and
that they change as a society changes. However, unlike primordialism it does not assume that
ethnicity inherently leads to conflict or violence, thus the onset of violence still needs to be
explained. For the constructivist, violence rises up out of a combination of factors from economic
pressure to loss of political rights. Constructivists believe that social systems give rise to conflicts
along ethnic lines, so the question for them is what has led to these sorts of social systems. The
institutional approach is able to explain the occurrence of ethnic peace. Under a constructivist
framework institutions can make all the difference. They can prevent instances of political
manipulation. For example in Kenya Daniel arap Moi was able to use the military to stir up
ethnically based conflict, but if the military is controlled by civilians and not by politicians, such
occurrences of political abuse would be unattainable. Institutions such as free press, elections, and
opposition parties not only give citizens ways to express their demands in a peaceful way, but if
people trust these institutions they believe there is a way to enact change without violence. In the
case of free press it means individuals can criticize the government so that political frustrations can
be aired and dealt with openly. Institutions create social trust which leads to ethnic peace.
Primordialism and instrumentalism are theories which explain ethnic violence. This is why
the choice of sub-Saharan Africa is significant. The cases chosen are ethnically diverse, and poor.
There are ethnic tensions and a lack of resources, but not necessarily ethnic violence. I posit it is
institutions which best explain the phenomenon of ethnic peace in a nation when all the factors
seem as though they would lead to violent ethnic conflict.
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Empirical testing of Three Models
The literature on ethnic violence can almost completely be divided by these three
approaches. All of course have their caveats, and valid points. There are a few outlying explanations,
although most are irrelevant to this study.
Primordialist
It would seem logical that primordialist reasoning for ethnic violence would be limited to
non-scholarly research, but this is precisely what Tatu Vanhanen (1999) has set out to demonstrate
in an empirical study of 183 nations between 1990 and 1996. Vanhanen takes the theoretical
standpoint that “all human populations share the same evolved behavioral predisposition to ethnic
nepotism” (55). His study takes a common assumption of many and attempts to back it up with
statistical significance. What he finds is that the evolutionary explanation holds true. As he explains,
“we have evolved to favour our relatives in the struggle for existence because it has been an adaptive
behavior pattern” (66). Thus, the more ethnic heterogeneity found in a nation the more likely there
will be ethnic conflict; he finds that this is the trend in the numbers. Minor variation between states
is explained by other explanatory factors like democratization, human development, and gross
domestic product per capita (PPP, purchasing power parity). The thesis of an “evolved disposition
to nepotism” does allow for a general theory which we can test. This represents a theoretical
improvement over scholars who use culturally specific factors only, which are unfalsifiable
(Vanhanen 1999, 56).
However, the problem is Vanhanen broadly generalizes what ethnic conflict is; there are
measures included for non-violent conflict such as ethnic partisanship which are added to a nation’s
total ethnic conflict score out of 200. The textbook case of poorly attempting to disguise ordinal
levels as interval levels is the “feeling thermometer,” and that is precisely what Vanhanen has
attempted to do. The paper lays out the difference between rating in intervals of 10, but there is no
explained difference between a score of say 10 versus one of 12 (Vanhanen 1999, 62). Further,
Vanhanen includes ethnically aligned political parties as adding to violence under the assumption
that particularism on a non-violent level either leads to or accompanies violent ethnic bias.
By contrast, this study will focus on the outbreak of violence. There are political parties with
violent or terrorist branches such as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and their affiliated
political party Herri Batasuna. Parties like Herri Batasuna are examples of how politics becomes
consumed with ethnicity and these collectives become actors in politics “seeking affirmative action
for the achievement or restoration of privileges and life chances in the name of ethnic (or racial)
equalization (Tambiah 1989, 344). Ethnically aligned political parties, while most likely problematic,
are not necessarily inherently negative aspects of a nation’s political system. For example Varshney
points out that the Bharatiya Janata Party—a Hindu nationalist party—beat out the secular Congress
party because it was seen as being less corrupt despite the less tolerant religious platform (2002). So
while there has been an attempt to debunk primordialist explanations the demonstration seems to be
inadequate. The stories of communal identities are compelling to groups and they set the tone for
how groups have interacted and how they conceive themselves. This is not to justify the idea that
groups will never get along, but rather that there is something both ascriptive and instrumental
about identity (Maalouf 2000) (Lake and Rothchild 1998) (Heilman and Kaiser 2002).
Although culture is not the sole explanation, it is important and necessary to discuss it when
considering ethnic violence. Culture is important for a collective, after all people have killed over
cultural difference, and thus important to explore. Genocide is by definition systematic killing with
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the design to exterminate an entire ethnic group. The danger is putting too much stake in culture
and reducing it to a simple primordialist explanation. Culture and ethnic identity is the field on
which violence can cast its seeds and cultivate. It is culture plus other factors which lead to ethnic
violence: “there are…significant difference in the use of motives and interests as explanatory
mechanisms which are central to the difference between cultural and rational choice explanations”
(Ross 1997, 308). The problem is that many studies look at the obvious examples of complete
conflict like Bosnia, and Rwanda and in these extremes, arguments of groups bitterly fighting and
being unable to find peace and stability hold up, but this is a cultural distance which has grown too
large. It is much like a self-fulfilling prophesy; cultures view themselves as distinct and distant from
another so rather than foster connections, distrust is built up and leads to a greater distance in
culture, and even less interaction (de la Roche 1996). Some scholars point to culture as having other
roles in ethnic conflict. It sets up the framework for conflict to take place.
Instrumentalism
Instrumentalism allows for a much more malleable interpretation of identity and for more
explanations of ethnic violence. The literature points out a vast array of theories, and factors which
play into the complicated, intricate web which ethnic violence rests. As stated before, there are
interest based models and those which point solely to elite manipulation as explanations. Dauda
Abubakar points out that groups are prone to elite manipulation only if it echoes their current
concerns: “ethnic identities become seriously amenable to political manipulation either when
suppressed groups feel marginalized from the political and economic process affecting their lives of
when privileged groups feel that their rights are threatened” (2001, 32). Abubakar goes on to
describe the case of Nigeria and how “the accumulated impact of decades of ethnic minority
marginalization; and the imposition of an economic adjustment program that increased poverty,
unemployment, and despair in the society” (2001, 34). Instrumentalism is termed the modernist
theory. The idea behind this theory is that colonizing nations, such as Britain and France,
exacerbated ethnic rivalry when they used divide and conquer strategies; this was followed by
structural adjustment which intensified poverty, leaving nations deeply fractured and poor. Thus, it
was the stacking up of cleavages which led to the onset of ethnic violence. As stated previously the
puzzling thing about arguments heavily based on cultural arguments is that nations which seem to fit
the criteria for balancing on the brink of peace and chaos are in fact remarkably peaceful.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) test empirically GDP per capita, and the population share of the
largest ethnic group, with the likelihood of civil war. Amongst their hypotheses is the common
assumption that the more diverse (or the smaller the population share of the largest ethnic group)
and the lower the GDP per capita, the more at risk a nation is for civil war. In a study of 127
conflicts out of a sample of 6,610 country years, Fearon and Laitin(2003) finds that ethnic diversity
is not a major cause of civil war; the key explanatory variable found in their study was per capita
income. However, this does not make ethnic diversity inconsequential because it may still “cause
civil war indirectly, if it causes a low per capita income” (Fearon and Laitin. 2003, 82). Per capita
income has much more to do with civil war than ethnic diversity. For example nations with a GDP
per capita over 3000 US dollars have almost no risk of civil war no matter what the ethnic
composition, and nations which are 90% homogenous, but with a GDP per capita of under 500 US
dollars have a 30% chance of civil violence. In one model they limit it to ethnic wars and find that
the strong effect of per capita income remains (Fearon and Litin 2003, 84). This does not answer
whether or not the causes of ethnic violence is economic scarcity though; it indicates that the causes
of civil war tend to be economic. It also does not address how some poor nations are peaceful.
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Although there may be a correlation this does not justify causation. As we will find out later, civil
war and economic scarcity can be self reinforcing, meaning that as nations grow unstable and poor
they are likely to continue to be so. The question remains, is ethnic violence the instrumental tool of
a political or economic group. One important factor they tease out is that nations are more than five
times as likely to enter into civil war if there has been “instability in governing arrangements in any
of the previous three years” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 85). What this indicates is that nations with
stronger institutions despite economic or demographic factors are less likely overall to descend into
violence either ethnic or civil.
Another facet of instrumentalism is the political entrepreneurs or manipulation of ethnicity
by elites for political gains. This is well illustrated by Africa’s history. Daniel arap Moi, Umaru
Yar’Adua, and Laurent Gbagbo are just a few examples of cunning—if not morally repugnant—
political leaders who have incited ethnic violence for their political gain. Kenyans seem to
understand best how ethnicity can be utilized for politics as they continue to experience outbreaks
of violence every time they hold an election since their first multiparty elections in 1992. This
reasoning is compelling, and probably helps in explaining quite a few cases of ethnic violence.
However, both economic and political instrumentalism fails to answer how ethnic peace occurs.
While the occurrence of political prospecting cannot be prevented, political institutions do control
for institutional opening available for exploiting ethnic groups, and allow for the expression of
political objections peacefully.
Constructivism
The other major explanation put forth is the importance of institutions. This is also the most
compelling in answering the question of this study, namely what are the causes of ethnic peace. This
has been the opposition to the primordialist based arguments and papers. One concept that is part
of this is the idea that political liberalization will first lead to an increase in violence, and once
democratization occurs there will be a decrease in ethnic violence (Smith 2000). Liberalization is
used here to mean political control being taken down, such as allowing freedom of press, getting rid
of arrests without charges, freedom from torture, or the “institutionalization of procedures for
popular government (Smith 2000, 25). The explanations and variables for ethnic peace are similar or
exactly the same as those presented for democratization theories. Smith (2000) focused on SubSaharan Africa, and showed that liberalization in fact leads to a decrease in violence, and
democratization has little to no visible effect after that. Unlike Vanhanen, Smith found purchasing
power parity, once again a proxy for human development, to have a robust inverse relationship with
ethnic violence (Smith 2000, 33). This reconfirms that interests are a key factor of ethnic violence,
but that “institutions sometimes can and do overcome the constraints imposed on them by
structural determinants” (Smith 2000, 35).
When there are viable political institutions for individuals and collectives to express their
interests, the violent reaction to interest based factors is reduced because there are democratic
outlets for these concerns. Ethnic violence is based on concerns over such things competition over
resources, and security (Lake and Rothchild 1998), but when the citizenry can utilize things like
elections, or even more simply when they feel that their anxieties are being addressed or voiced by
the media, then the likelihood of ethnic violence lessens (Bratton 1997). As stated before,
institutions such as a free press can be key to ethnic peace, as can a civilian controlled military. For
example, in Burundi it was the Tutsi who controlled the military, and so what propagated the onset
of some of the killing sprees was Tutsi fear of a Hutu uprising and so in order to protect themselves
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they had the military kill thousands of Hutu either with no reason or with rumored killings of Tutsi
villages by Hutu people (Uvin 1999).
Varshney rejects institutional explanation because according to him it fails to explain regional
difference in ethnic violence (2002, 38). In the case of India this seems to be true; they share all the
same institutions. But some cities and regions experience numerous riots and killings, while others
are completely or relatively peaceful. He posits that the actual make-it-or-break-it factor is civil
society. However fascinating a regional case study like Varshney’s translated for a few African
nations would be, the availability of data is an overwhelming obstacle. Varshney read different
Indian newspapers for years and interpreted incidences like riots as either ethnically driven or not; he
was also in India. The problem is there really is no way to verify Varshney’s study; the reasoning may
be compelling, but it could be that India is an isolated incident because it is such a huge nation. Also
it is difficult to discern whether or not civic engagement is encouraged by strong democratic
institutions.

Research Design
This study will look at two pairs of sub-Saharan African nations: (1) Cote d’Ivoire and
Ghana, and (2) Kenya and Tanzania. One nation is relatively violent and the other relatively
peaceful, respectively. By using small-n comparison method, the finer details of what causes ethnic
peace can be teased out. These nations have specific master narratives, or ways in which they
construct their national identity; they are all scarce in resources, all being developing nations; and
they have varying institutional factors.
My hypothesis is that institutions absorb conflict either by creating peaceful mechanisms or
by preventing abuse in political systems. This institutional carrying capacity is what I believe best
explains the occurrence of ethnic peace in nations at risk. The expected results are that master
narratives will be oppositional and particularist; the resources of all will be scarce and so the conflict
of violence will not be a product of economic battling, but over political rights. Nations with strong
institutions such as, elections, free press, separate legislatures and courts will not be marred by ethnic
violence, even though the minority groups may seem ripe for it. In other words many of these
nations have demographics which make them more than likely candidates for ethnic conflict, but the
exact opposite has been true, especially in the case of Tanzania. Gurr (1993) termed these groups
“minorities at risk,” but what is it that makes risky national minorities safe?
The dependent variable therefore is ethnic violence. This study will limit this to violent
interactions such as rioting, lynching (or something similar), and murders. These may not be very
specific numbers but since this is a comparative study a general presence of such violence may be
able to suffice, of course depending on the lack of violence in the peaceful nations. Unlike
Varshney’s, this study will focus on nations and not regions. And, since we have better measures for
national violence, the overall peacefulness of a nation can be determined (Brubaker & Laitin 1998).
An ordinal level measure can be employed for ethnic violence (Smith 2000, 27). This will allow for a
varying level to be ascertained, although allowing for a great deal of leeway.
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire share a border, are both coastal western nations, and have
demographics that are fairly similar. Ghana is relatively peaceful and in fact the poster child of
structural adjustment, and Cote d’Ivoire is mired in problems, even with the presence of 9,000 UN
forces. The one problem in this pairing is that Ghana was colonized by the British and Cote
d’Ivoire by the French. Different colonial powers vastly change the experience of each nation, and
thus make them irrelevant to compare. Obviously the colonial experience has shaped each of these
nations very differently, and so this is not an area which should simply be ignored; this is a key
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possible explanation for the vast difference between these neighbors. These nations have similar
GDP per capita, poverty levels, and ethnic and religious break downs; the key difference is their
colonial past.
Tanzania is one of the most stable and peaceful nations in Africa. Muslims are dominant in
the region of Zanzibar comprising almost 99% of the population, and as a whole 35% of the total
population. In neighboring Kenya, President Daniel arap Moi buckled to pressure and allowed for
multi-party elections, although warning that parties would polarize the country on ethnic lines. It
seems he was right. The problem of this pair is that Tanzania is 30% Christian whereas Kenya is at
least 70% Christian, with it Muslim estimates varying. Is this a case of comparing apples and oranges
as Varshney puts it? A possible solution to this is simply limiting the comparison to coastal Kenya.
Muslims have concentrated on the coast having moved their way along it. In order to keep Tanzania,
an interesting case, Kenya is the most appropriate comparison. Although there are nations with
comparable religious break downs, Kenya allows a comparison of neighbors, two east coast nations,
and controls for similar ethnic or lingual divides. Both are British colonies, but it is the postindependence history and government policies which have made them so different.

Data and Analysis
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire
Ghana was the first sub-Saharan nation to gain independence from the British in 1957 and
set the example for other nations. Like most African nations Ghana is extremely diverse. There are
approximately 100 different cultural and linguistic groups. The major ethnic groups are Akan, Ewe,
Mole-Dagbane, Guan, and Ga-Adangbe (CIA World Factbook). There are cultural, historical, and
linguistic differences and they are historically rooted in competition for trade and land control. As
late as 1994 the ethnic tensions erupted in violence over what was reported as a historical land
dispute (BBC). Although ethnic identification has influences on Ghanaian life and politics, it has
been outlawed in political parties. These seem to be historical constructions. There are few social or
institutional differences, but nonetheless the history of group solidarity has prevailed. These have
arisen from past tribal wars, alliances, territorial disputes, slave trading etc. Each has a stereotypical
characterization, e.g., combative, boastful, passive, conservative, cheap. Some groups have written
languages; these are often viewed as superior to those with only spoken dialects. It is also interesting
to note there are no racially homogenous regions; the various ethnic groups are spread out. Ghana’s
leader in the independence movement was Kwame Nkrumah, and he envisioned a united Africa
under the ideas of Pan-Africanism (Lake 1995).
Cote d’Ivoire has been independent from French rule since 1960.There are more than 60
ethnic groups in Cote d’Ivoire, and due to its relative economic success, immigrants from
surrounding impoverished nations have flooded in and now comprise over a quarter of the
population. In 2002 civil war broke out in Cote d’Ivoire and although fighting has subsided for the
most part, the country remains divided with rebels controlling the north, and the government
controlling the south. Amongst reasons often cited for the civil war is the influx of foreigners,
predominantly from Burkina Faso, and discrimination of individuals of Burkinabe descent. ‘Ivoirity’
is a term which was meant to denote all people living in Cote d’Ivoire, but unfortunately it has been
used to espouse nationalist and xenophobic ideas. Scholars cite the strong leadership of HouphouetBoigny as the reason that ethnic tensions didn’t boil over earlier. Houphouet-Boigny’s successor
Henri Bedie fled in the 1999 coup by Robert Guei, but managed to spark a movement of
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xenophobia against Muslims and so called non-Ivoirians, including Bedie’s political rival Alassane
Ouattara who was barred from the election due to his non-Ivorian parentage (BBC).
Even in recent news reports Cote D’Ivoire has been the scene of much ethnic violence;
mostly in the form of revenge attack by a Guere tribe on a Dioula tribe in the north. Forty-one
villagers were killed after more than a hundred Gueres were cut to pieces with machetes and sprayed
with bullets. The Guere is derived from a term for forest-dwelling people, and is in fact sometimes
used in general to refer to people considered uncivilized. Dioula is a variation of a word referring to
“the land of slaves captures through warfare. The exact differences between these groups is very
confusing; the Guere in some parts are the Wobe, and the Dioula are dialectically similar to the
Wobe, and the Dioula were often called the Guere by early scholars, and both languages are Mande
languages (Holsoe 1976). What is clear is that their definitions of themselves are in opposition to
one another. What sparked the ethnic killings in 2005 has been reported to be a refusal by the Guere
to take part in an indigenous protest organized by the Dioula. Whether or not this is the truth may
in fact be irrelevant in light of the escalated response.
These two nations have strikingly different histories. While Cote d’Ivoire’s recent politics has
been centered on rejection of other Africans, Ghana’s history began with ideas of uniting Africans.
It might be that economic interests are the root cause. The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
of Ghana (1,516) is lower than that of Cote d’Ivoire (1,775), but a greater percentage of the citizenry
is in poverty in Cote d’Ivoire compared to Ghana, 42 to 28.5 respectively. These two nations
because they are neighbors influence one another so heavily. So while there is an economic upturn
recently in Ghana, there has been a downturn in Cote d’Ivoire. As stability is suspect in Cote
d’Ivoire, many companies are diverting their trade to neighboring nations, although businesses
suspect that this is not a lasting effect (BBC). So in the case of Cote d’Ivoire it was a military coup
with a heavy ethnic element to it which preceded the economic downturn: “Ivory Coast used to be a
beacon of peace and prosperity in West Africa, attracting millions of migrant workers and refugees”
(BBC).
Instrumentalism also takes the form of political manipulation by the elites. Human Rights
Watch in 2001 accused the government of Cote d’Ivoire of deliberately using ethnic violence for
political gains. The gendarmes or paramilitary police were targeting supporters of the opposing
candidate Ouattara (the foreigner). The gendarmes during the election sided with Laurent Gbagbo,
who won against Guei, the incumbent military ruler. Human rights watch claims “200 people were
killed in the past year, while others were tortured, raped and arbitrarily detained” (BBC). The
gendarmes who were implicated were found not guilty in spite of the testimony of two survivors.
What is more telling are the differences in their institutions as indicated by Table 1. In
structure, both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have legislatures and courts independent from the
executive branch, but one party tends to dominate in Cote d’Ivoire where that does not occur in
Ghana. There are no viable opposition parties at this time in Cote d’Ivoire, but it seems that this
may very well be on the brink of change. Elections were called off in October of 2008 and expected
to be rescheduled in 2009. Ghana is on the verge of another election, and while eight candidates are
running for the presidency four have realistic chances with the major issue being corruption. The
viability of parties and many other things is difficult to asses in Cote d’Ivoire because it is still split
between the north and the south. As suspected, the freedom of press is much lower in Cote d’Ivoire
compared to Ghana as is the level of freedom. There are not yet any numbers out on trust in
institutions or trust in individuals for Cote d’Ivoire, but a stark difference in them would not be
surprising.
These nations are both ethnically diverse, and this has caused violence, although to varying
degrees. So the effect of ethnicity is consistent in that there are ethnicities which do conflict. The
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effect of economic interests is present because a greater percentage of Ivoirians live below the
poverty line. If we look back at previous poverty levels in Cote d’Ivoire we see that, before the
military coup and the beginnings of instability, Ivoirians enjoyed a level of 33% much closer to
Ghana’s 31.8% in 1992 (oecd.org, data.un.org). Given this it is not economic interests which have
spurred the ethnic violence. The coup occurred to oust Bedie who began the ‘Ivority’ movement
against Muslims and foreigners, so the violence preceded the economic problems. Political
manipulation in Cote d’Ivoire is another reason espoused by many. Indeed it has been the case that
leaders in Africa have used ethnicity to bolster their own support, but I still believe that this is an
outcome of weak institutions. The military of Cote d’Ivoire took sides in the politics which is why
they were used to incite fear amongst opposition supporters. Had the military stayed out of the
political arena then there would have been less means for politicians to use ethnicity. Therefore we
are left with the weakness of Ivorian institutions versus the well trusted Ghanaian institutions.
Table 1: Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire
Civilian military control *
Independent legislatures*
Viable opposition parties *
Free press: media freedom and private
press*
Level of freedom**
Trust in institutions ***
Trust of other ethnicities compared to
average trust in own ethnicity***
GDP per capita****
% below poverty line****

Ghana
Yes
Yes
High
3- free
64.9%
43.5/65.5
66%
1,516
28.5

Cote d’Ivoire
No, one party domination
No
Low, and very dangerous to both
local and foreign media
12 - not free
NA
NA
1,775
42

*determined by interpretive reading of BBC country profiles and articles
**Freedom House- the number is a total of the rating for political and civil liberties.
***Afrobarometer Round 3- percent responding “a lot” or “somewhat” out of 4 choices
****CIA World Factbook

Tanzania and Kenya
Tanzania and Kenya, both former British colonies are neighbors and share many similarities.
The Swahili language pervades both these nations and along with English, it is a way for many to
communicate despite varying mother tongues. These nations are also better studied as there have
been prominent periods of peace.
Tanzania is almost equally divided in religion between Christians, Muslims, and those who
practice indigenous beliefs. However, no particular identity has dominated politic or society. This is
not to say that religion is not a divisive issue; according to a nation-wide opinion poll “people
objected to interreligious marriages more strongly than to other forms of cross-identity marriages”
(Heilman 2002, 695). The religious divide is also the only one to manifest itself in political parties.
Nothing formally separates Christian and Muslims, marriages are not outlawed, and it is not
uncommon for someone to follow both religions, and although there is no statistical class division,
there is a “feeling among many Muslims that the country’s educated elite is disproportionately made
up of Christians” (Heilman 2002, 698). The ‘standard view’ of society in Tanzania and the so called
master narrative has been presented by many to be one of harmony between Christians and
Muslims. The independence movement that took place in Tanzania was filled with rhetoric about
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the need to get rid of second-class citizenship based on racism, which was seen as being part of
colonial rule. Julius Kambarage Nyrere, the leader of the Tanganyikan African National Union
enacted a law for multi-racial citizenship. Furthermore, many Muslims became leaders of the
independence movement while Christian churches discouraged such activities. Thus the story is that
Christians joined Muslim leaders in the national struggle.
Two competing narratives are those of Christians and Muslims separately. Muslims want to
balance the disparities in education, and thus political power and government leadership. According
to Islamists in Tanzania, Muslims are unable to form organizations freely, and are harassed and
arrested based on religion. Christians are afraid that religion will enter the political arena and
Muslims will undermine the strength of the state by seeking only a Muslim agenda.
Most Kenyans are multi-lingual, speaking English and Swahili, as well as a mother tongue
such as Kikuyu or Luo. No single ethnic group holds the majority, but Kikuyu is the most widely
spoken language though, only representing a little over 20 percent of the population. Kikuyus led the
independence movement in Kenya, and since have enjoyed the benefits of one-party rule (BBC).
The oppressive regime of Jomo Kenyatta sought rents for the Kikuyu in terms of land ownership in
the Rift Valley, which has been the subsequent scene of much ethnic violence (Human Rights
Watch). The situation concerning languages is confusing in Kenya. Swahili is often used in primary
school and English in further education. English is the lingua franca thanks to the British and
therefore to obtain civil service of bureaucratic jobs it is a must. However in the parliament, Swahili
is language of debate, and propaganda. In urban settings, such as Nairobi where Kikuyu form the
majority, what is developing is a new sort of vernacular, a Kenyanized Swahili. The Kikuyu are
thought of as the “indigenous inhabitants of Nairobi, are a large component of the new elite, [and
are well] represented in professional, clerical, administrative and political positions,” thus the Kikuyu
language is still of use in occupational interactions (Laitin 1989, 56). Since the inception of multiparty elections, Kenya has been plagued by outbreaks of ethnic violence. Kikuyus are the object of
resentment because of the relative economic success. Luos have tried to drive Kikuyus from the Rift
Valley and Kikuyus have in turn responded. These tensions have also been escalated because of the
ethnicities of the presidential candidates Mwai Kibaki being Kikuyu, and Raila Odinga being Luo.
Again these identities are constructed not so much on the basis of who the Kikuyu and Luos are but
in opposition to one another.
As stated before, these two nations are extremely diverse, Tanzania religiously, and Kenya
linguistically. Kenya has not seen an outbreak which escalated into a larger conflict, but it has
experienced periods of ethnic violence. Early in 2008 Kenya saw episodes of ethnic violence due to
contested election results of Kibaki’s victory in light of election rigging (BBC). Tanzania which even
has Zanzibar, a possible separatist region, has been notably peaceful.
It may be that economic interests are at play seeing as how Kenya has a larger percentage of
citizens below the poverty line than Tanzania, 50 to 36 percent respectively as can be seen in Table
2. Looking at earlier poverty levels, in 1994 Kenya’s was 40 percent, and in 1991 Tanzania’s was 39
percent (data.un.org). The first occurrence of ethnic violence was in the run-up to the first multiparty elections in 1992, the second occurrence was for the 1997 election and was considered by
many to be worse (BBC). In 1997 the poverty level was 52%, higher than it is currently. So once
again it would seem that it is not economic strain which causes ethnic violence, but the other way
around. Tanzania is still in the top 100 for the percentage of people below the poverty line, and even
though it is relatively better off compared to Kenya these are both very poor nations where
economic interests are always at play, but do not always play into ‘tribal clashes.’
The popular reasoning offered by academics and observers is that the onset of Kenyan tribal
violence is due to the rise of multiparty elections in 1992. The logic is primordialist; ethnic groups
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like the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Maasai, and Kalenjin are involved in a historical conflict which leaders
like Moi were able to keep under control with repressive policies. Perhaps this theory is why Moi
warned of Kenya’s ‘inevitable’ descent into ‘tribal clashes.’ It would seem his prediction was correct:
Kenya’s political parties had dived largely along ethnic lines, and ‘tribal clashes’ in the rural areas of
western Kenya had left hundreds dead and tens of thousands displaced” (Human Rights Watch).
However, the occurrence of violence in the Rift Valley of Kenya was actually the conniving
orchestration of Moi for political gain. Moi, following the precedent set by Kenyatta, provided rents
for his own minority Kalenjin just as Kenyatta did for the Kikuyus (Human Rights Watch).
In quite the opposite fashion the primary reason many cite for Tanzania’s remarkable peace
is the policies imposed by Julius Nyerere, the founding president of the dominant party Chama cha
Mapinduzi. Nyerere was able to detribalize national politics by “adopting Kiswahili as the country’s
official language and, in so doing, forged a sense of national unity among Tanzanians” (BBC).
Perhaps most surprising is how Tanzania has managed to remain peaceful during huge political
changes, namely its shift from socialist to capitalist, and then to multiparty elections. In a nation with
more enduring institutions it would seem that a shift towards democracy does not lead to more
violence, and that it is political manipulation at work, rather than ancient conflicts. Just as in the case
of Cote d’Ivoire the weakness of Kenyan institutions, such as a high incidence of election rigging
and corruption, has allowed for ethnic violence to take place while in Tanzania high trust in
institutions has enabled ethnic peace.
The level of freedom based on Freedom House statistics is equal, but the level of trust in
political and civic institutions is remarkably different. Tanzania has such a high rate of trust, and if
we exclude “trust in an opposition party” the average in trust is 83.5 percent instead of 75.9 percent.
Perhaps this further illustrates that it doesn’t matter whether or not institutions are good, only if
individuals perceive them to be. The partnership between mainland Tanganyika and the island of
Zanzibar has lasted for since 1964, although with mixed reviews. Zanzibar has remained semiautonomous with its own president and parliament, but some islanders believe that they are
suffering in terms of infrastructure, schools, and health (BBC). Whether it is the federalist structure,
or the 2004 membership into Fifa—allowing Zanzibar a football team separate from Tanzania’s—it
is quite telling that Tanzania has been “spared the internal strife that has blighted so many African
nations” (BBC).
The stark differences between Tanzania and Kenya truly show how far institutions can aid in
maintaining peace. Kenya is ethnically diverse, very poor, and very violent, especially around election
time. Tanzania is ethnically diverse, very poor, and very peaceful. The explanation for Kenyan
violence seems to be political manipulation by the likes of Moi and Kibaki, but what best explains
the ethnic peace is that citizens trust institutions, which allow for gradual and peaceful change in the
system through democratic means.
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Table 2: Tanzania and Kenya
Civilian military control *
Independent legislatures*
Viable opposition parties *
Free press: media freedom and private press*
Level of freedom**
Trust in institutions ***
Trust of other ethnicities compared to
average trust in own ethnicity***
GDP per capita****
% below poverty line****

Tanzania
Yes
No, multiparty
elections in 1990
High
Low in Zanzibar
7 partly free
75.9
67.4/80.1
80.5%
1, 354
36

Kenya
No
Yes
Yes
Self censorship during
Kenyatta and Moi,
7 partly free
56.9
31.6/49.3
64%
1,746
50

*determined by interpretive reading of BBC country profiles and articles
**Freedom House- the number is a total of the rating for political and civil liberties.
***Afrobarometer Round 3
****CIA World Factbook

Conclusion
There are three theories or ways of looking at ethnic violence: primordialist, instrumentalist,
and constructivist. Primordialism is riddled with assumptions about the nature of ethnicities, and
about human nature. It asserts that ethnicity itself is the cause of ethnic violence and so nations
which are more diverse are more likely to be violent. In fact, the case seems to be that ethnic
diversity has the least to do with violence, although it is a necessary condition for ethnic violence.
Instrumentalism, very convincingly, explains that ethnic violence is based on economic and
political competition. Ethnic groups are either used by political elites, or the individuals make the
rational choice to compete with other ethnic groups over scarce resources or access to political
power such as executive office. While economic scarcity empirically correlates and explains some
cases of violence it fails to explain how it is that so many poor countries are peaceful. The same can
be said for political manipulation, which is present in many cases of violence. The reasoning for how
it is elites are unable to pull the strings in other nations is absent.
Finally constructivism, or the institutional argument, posits that the strength of political
institutions best explains the occurrence or absence of ethnic peace. It is the only approach which
answers how peace comes about; peace is not just the absence of violence. In an answer to
instrumentalist arguments constructivists find that institutions prevent circumstances such as
political manipulation. Strong institutions create civic trust which means citizens believe that the
ballot is more powerful than the bullet, or in many African cases, the machete. Democratic outlets
such as free and fair elections, viable opposition parties, and a free press enable individuals to enact
change in the political system without murdering their neighbors.
One question unanswered is how outside forces affect ethnic violence. It could be that
ethnic groups have an incentive to remain peaceful due to economic prosperity associated with
peace or other geopolitical calculations. It could be the case that national minorities are better off as
minorities in a larger nation rather than as majorities in a nation of their own, without any resources.
The study of ethnic peace allows us to observe different factors at play and it will help in preventing
further atrocities.
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